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has provided us with another 
insightful of evolutionary theory. The 
Extended Phenotype is a collection of ideas and 
new perspectives advocating the author’s gene’s 
eye view of evolution. Much of the book is de- 
voted to clearing up confusion and misunder- 
standing among evolutionary biologists and col- 
leagues in related disciplines such as 
developmental biology, ecology, ethology, and 
genetics. Excellent reviews are presented of kin 
selection, “genetic determinism,” “adaptation- 
ism,” and “fitness”. 
The central argument of the book concerns 
the unit of selection. Dawkins identifies two 
types of evolutionary entities: “replicators” and 
“vehicles” (cf. Dawkins, 1976). Replicators pro- 
duce identical copies of themselves, usually 
from within the confines of a nested hierarchy 
of vehicles (chromosomes, organisms, groups?). 
Because only the bits of DNA or RNA defined 
as “genes” replicate copies of themselves from 
generation to generation, Dawkins argues that 
genes are the ‘unit’ of selection. Most evolu- 
tionary biologists agree (e.g., Williams, 1966). 
Dawkins presses the issue further. Noting 
that genes can have phenotypic effects outside 
of the organism (e.g., a spider’s web), he sug- 
gests that “vehicles” such as the organism are 
superfluous entities. Dawkins proposes a “new 
central theorem of the extended phenotype: An 
animal’s behaviour tends to maximize the sur- 
vival of the genes ‘for’ that bchaviour, whether 
or not those genes happen to be in the body of 
the particular animal performing the behaviour” 
(p. 248). For example, the nestling feeding be- 
havior of a cuckoo host may be viewed as an 
extended phenotype effect of genes in the par- 
asitic cuckoo. 
Dawkins’ argument that evolutionary expla- 
nations need not involve the intermediary enti- 
ties of vehicles has several drawbacks. First, 
web genes, even though they have effects out- 
side of the organism, are still tied to the repro- 
duction of the individual spider and kin. Simi- 
larly, cuckoo genes, although they influence the 
behavior of the host organism, are still tied to 
the reproduction of the cuckoo. Moreover, such 
genes must use their own cuckoo organism to 
affect the behavior of the host. The feeding be- 
havior of the host is elicited by the begging be- 
havior of the cuckoo. There is no way to elim- 
inate the intermediate step in the path from gene 
+ phenotypic effect in organism + phenotypic 
affect on other organisms. 
The concept of the extended phenotype em- 
phasizes the need to think in terms of evolu- 
tionary competition among genes rather than 
competition among organisms. This point is well 
taken. 
To understand adaptation, however, it is im- 
portant to consider how differential reproduc- 
tion at the various levels of life organization 
(e.g., gene, linked genes, chromosome, genome, 
gamete, individual, family, group) contribute to 
the differential representation of genes in future 
generations (Williams, 1966; Lewontin, 1970; 
Leigh, 1977; Alexander and Borgia, 1978). 
Genes may have many phenotypic effects, some 
of which are favored by selection at one level, 
but disfavored at another (e.g., Lewontin’s dis- 
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cussion of t-alleles in mice). The emergent prop- 
erties resulting from gene coalitions (e.g., 
Leigh’s “parliament of the genes” and Alex- 
ander and Borgia’s “outlaw genes”) seem best 
analyzed from the levels of selection perspec- 
tive. Dawkins does provoke one to rethink care- 
fully the mechanisms by which natural selection 
operates. 
Dawkins also provokes one to rethink the 
mechanisms by which the selection of cultural 
traits occurs. He persists with his concept of the 
“meme,” now defined as the mental construct 
that generates a cultural trait, similar to Cloak’s 
(1975) concept of “i-culture”. 
a history of natural selection on human abilities 
to utilize the accumulated body of information 
that comprises culture. The selection of cultural 
traits by an individual may be independent of the 
genetic transmission of that individual, but it 
never can be independent of the past history of 
natural selection that created and guided the 
mechanisms of cultural selection (Alexander, 
1979; Flinn and Alexander, 1982). 
Critical to Dawkins’ meme theory, indeed, 
his view of cultural evolution, is the necessity 
that a meme be a replicator. Dawkins requires 
that memes have a “definite structure, realized 
in whatever physical medium the brain uses for 
storing information” (p. 109). However, no 
chemical or synaptic structures in the brain have 
been found that correspond to specific behaviors 
or cultural traits (Pribram, 1971). The physical 
composition of information storage and manip- 
ulation probably varies from individual to indi- 
vidual and changes throughout ontogeny. 
Dawkins’ model is based on the premise that 
memes culturally evolve to maximize their sur- 
vival. Like genes, memes are ‘selected’ on the 
basis of their effects: “If the phenotypic effect 
of a meme is a tune, the catchier it is the more 
likely it is to be copied” (p. 110). 
Dawkins notes several weaknesses in the 
meme/gene analogy. First, “it is not clear that 
they [memes] occupy and compete for discrete 
‘loci,’ or that they have identifiable ‘alleles’ (p. 
112). Second, the meme “copying process is 
probably much less precise” (p. 112). And third, 
“New ‘mutations’ may be ‘directed’ rather than 
random” (p. 112). He concludes that “These dif- 
ferences may prove sufficient to render the anal- 
ogy with genetic natural selection worthless or 
even positively misleading” (p. 112). 
In the final chapter, “Rediscovering the or- 
ganism,” Dawkins analyzes the integrity of the 
individual. Among other topics, he discusses ‘in- 
dividuality’ in regard to asexual reproduction 
and vegetative growth (cf. Harper, 1977; Janzen, 
1977). Dawkins suggests that development and 
ontogeny are important criteria distinguishing 
cellular reproduction via asexual propagules 
(e.g., dandelion seeds) from growth. He further 
notes that asexual reproduction involves germ- 
line cell division, whereas growth involves so- 
matic or ‘dead end’ cell division. This discussion 
is especially fun for those of us who study rel- 
atively mundane species from the animal king- 
dom. Dawkins conjures up images of “a primi- 
tive plant consisting of a flat, pad-like thallus, 
floating on the surface of the sea . . . spreading 
into an ever larger circular green carpet, like a 
monstrous lily pad several miles across and still 
growing.” Although he suggests that this is not 
“reproduction in an interesting sense,” it is 
characteristic of his writing in an interesting 
sense. Dawkins makes good use of wit, meta- 
phor, and example throughout the book. 
The Extended Phenotype is exciting and very 
worthwhile reading. Many important issues in 
evolution and behavior are objectively summa- 
rized with thorough and up-to-date references. 
Dawkins presents his arguments in straightfor- 
ward fashion and pushes them to their logical 
ends. He is not afraid to make clear his points, 
even if clarity causes them to be more vulnerable 
to critics. I strongly recommend the book to all 
students of evolution. 
In spite of this caveat, Dawkins goes on to 
argue that the acquisition of cultural traits is in- 
dependent of biological adaptation: “a meme 
has its own opportunities for replication and its 
own phenotypic effects, and there is no reason 
why success in a meme should have any con- 
nection whatever with biological success” (p. 
116). I disagree. 
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